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Purpose of review 
Self-reported bodily symptoms are of primary importance in health care and in 
health-related research. Typically they are assessed in clinical interviews or by 
means of traditional questionnaire formats that require the respondent to provide 
retrospective symptom estimates rated along intuitive frequency and/or intensity 
standards and aggregated across varying or unspecified time windows.  
Recent findings 
Retrospective symptom assessments are often biased when compared to (averaged) 
momentary assessments of symptoms. A variety of factors and conditions have been 
identified to influence the amount of bias in symptom reporting. Recent research has 
focused on the underlying mechanisms for the discrepancy between memory and 
experience. It is suggested that different types of questions and formats assess 
different types of information that each may be relevant for other purposes. 
Knowledge of these underlying mechanisms also provides a relevant framework to 
better understand individual differences in symptom reporting, including somatoform 
and somatic symptom disorder.  
Summary 
Accuracy of self-reported bodily symptoms is important for the clinician and the 
researcher. Understanding the mechanisms underlying bias may be provide an 
interesting window to understand how symptom episodes are processed, encoded 
and consolidated in memory and provide clues to modify symptom experiences.  
 
Keywords 
Autobiographical memory, episodic memory, somatoform disorder, self-report, 
symptoms 
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Introduction 
 Retrospective symptom reports play a primary role when patients consult their 
physician. They serve as a major source of information for further testing, clinical 
diagnosis, functional assessment, and informed treatment choice. Also researchers 
assess self-reported symptoms using standardized questionnaires and rating scales 
to answer a multitude of health-related research questions. Symptom questionnaires 
typically require the respondent to provide retrospective symptom estimates rated 
along intuitive frequency and/or intensity standards (seldom, frequent, almost daily; 
low, medium, high, etc.) and aggregated across varying or unspecified time windows 
(e.g. the past week, month, etc.) [1]. Such intuitive integrations of memory-based 
information rely on complex psychological processes that are often biasing self-
reports, that is, they may not correspond closely with actually experienced 
symptoms.  
 Biases in self-reports have contributed to concerns about the validity of traditional 
questionnaires and to the increasing use of momentary ambulatory assessments in 
real time and context (ecological momentary assessment, EMA) in order to obtain 
more accurate, experience-near data [e.g., 2]. Since the latter are considered to 
provide a more objective standard, much research has been devoted to establish the 
amount of and the conditions for bias in retrospective symptom reports by comparing 
them to momentary assessments. Recently, however, research shifted towards 
understanding the processes underlying answers to questions about one’s internal 
state [3]. This perspective has also opened a way to improve our understanding of 
stable individual differences that are reflected in elevated symptom reports, such as 
observed in persons with high habitual levels of symptoms, and patients with so-
called medically unexplained symptoms, and somatoform and functional somatic 
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disorders. In this review, we will address these issues with a focus on bodily 
symptoms, and occasionally extend our discussion to affective and mood-related 
symptoms.   
 
Accuracy and bias in retrospective symptom reports 
 Symptom questionnaires are often found to overestimate actually experienced 
symptom levels as indicated by a discrepancy between recalled symptoms and 
averaged EMA. This so-called memory-experience gap [4] is found in children [5,6*, 
7–9] as well as in adult patients [10–14] and healthy persons [15,16,17**,18**]. Also 
emotions and positive and negative affect are often retrospectively overreported 
[7,19,20,21*] which may contribute to an illusion of positive change when comparing 
retrospective measures of pre-therapeutic distress with actual assessment of distress 
[22]. However, also accurate retrospective memory as well as underestimation of 
symptoms have occasionally been reported [23–26,27*]. Several factors appear to 
influence bias in symptom reports (see Table 1).  
----------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
---------------- 
EMA provide in general more accurate and rich information by allowing to assess the 
variability and context dependency of symptoms. However, the burden on the 
respondent is rather high and sometimes application of EMA is not feasible. 
Alternative methods in-between EMA and classic questionnaires have been 
developed to assess somatic and affective symptoms in everyday life such as end-of-
day diaries and the Day Reconstruction Method [53–55]. These methods may also 
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provide reliable estimates of symptom intensity levels as well their variability, 
especially if collected multiple times across the reporting period [56,57].  
Understanding bias 
 As symptom episodes are experienced, they are processed, encoded and 
consolidated by the individual in functional memory (sub)systems that contribute to 
self-referential thinking about one’s present, past and future, and help to maintain 
self-identity. One functional subsystem is autobiographical memory [or self-memory 
system; 58,59] which in the case of symptom episodes, represents unique health-
related information that is contextualized in time and space and has particular 
relevance for the self. Another functional subsystem is personal semantic memory 
[60,61*] that represents information about the self that is abstracted from experience 
and devoid of unique contextual details, implying beliefs about one’s personality, 
roles and general autobiographical facts. Symptom schemata and illness beliefs, 
reflecting commonalities across multiple symptom and illness episodes as well as 
semantic knowledge and lay beliefs, can be considered part of personal semantic 
memory. These theoretical concepts can help to understand bias in retrospective 
symptom reporting [see Conner & Feldman Barrett, 3]. 
 Because the memory-experience gap, e.g. retrospective overestimation of 
symptoms as compared to averaged momentary assessments, appears immediately 
after a symptom episode [17**,35] and remains rather stable across subsequent 
measurements over a two-week period [17**], it is unlikely to simply result from 
memory decay over time. Such findings are more compatible with an idea that 
different types of measurement gauge different types of information, and possibly 
assess different “functional selves” [3,62]. First, momentary assessments reveal 
experiential knowledge or information provided by an experiencing self in a “here-
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and-now” context. They are therefore more closely related than retrospective 
measures to objective measures of biobehavioral processes involved in being and 
behaving in that context, such as parameters of autonomic, neuro-endocrine and 
immune functioning as well as to affective networks in the brain that are associated 
with experiencing a particular state [63–65]. 
Second, retrospective assessments about a proximal past may probe information 
as it has been encoded and consolidated in autobiographic episodic memory. It 
reflects information from a “remembering self” that may have more interest in being 
adaptive to guide future behaviour rather than being accurate in representing the 
past [59]. For example, it may be more relevant to remember how unpleasant an 
aversive bodily experience was at its peak and how much it got better at the end 
rather than to remember (and equally weighing) every single moment of the 
experience. In other words, the peak-end bias in retrospective symptom reports may 
represent an adaptive bias [17**,33,37]. Interestingly, the peak-end rule predicted 
recalled labor pain up to 2 months after delivery confirming that labor duration is 
largely neglected. However, this effect was diluted in multiparous compared to 
primiparous mothers, showing that previous experience moderates the peak-end 
memory rule [36].   
 Third, probing information of a more distal past may address personal semantic 
memory rather than integrated and remembered episodes, reflecting a “believing 
self” that is more influenced by beliefs about oneself as an historical person with a 
particular personality, gender and cultural context. Obviously, both episodic and 
semantic systems may be involved in retrospective ratings to different degrees 
depending on factors, such as the retention interval and the availability of details [66]. 
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Recent findings suggest that when retention intervals extend 3-7 weeks also 
semantic elements are used to reconstruct hedonic evaluations of past episodes [67]. 
 The view that different ways of assessment tap into different sources of 
information has important consequences. When the relationship between self-reports 
and objective physiological measures is the focus of interest, EMA will generally 
result in more valid data. However, when the goal is to understand and predict future 
health-related decisions, treatment adherence and illness behavior of patients, 
remembered symptoms, symptom schemata and illness beliefs may be more 
relevant than actually experienced symptoms as assessed by EMA [3,68–
70,71*,72*]. 
  
Understanding individual differences in symptom overreporting 
 The experience of a symptom entails a sensory-perceptual component referring to 
intensity, location, and other qualities, and an affective-motivational component 
providing the drive for action to preserve the integrity of the body [73–77]. A question 
prompting a symptom report from the individual requires an intuitive integration of 
both components into one global symptom report. This process is influenced by 
emotional states [76]. So, it is no surprise that symptom reports tend to be more 
elevated with higher state anxiety, distress, as well as in individuals scoring high for 
trait negative affectivity, a personality trait characterized by an overreactive 
evaluative system, elevated threat sensitivity, and vulnerability to negative emotions 
(see Table 1). A positive relationship between trait negative affectivity and symptom 
reporting shows up during controlled symptom inductions [78–81] as well as in the 
absence of physiological dysfunction [81–83]. High trait negative affectivity also 
characterizes high habitual symptom reporters among healthy persons [84*,85] as 
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well as patients with somatoform disorder [86,87]. Interestingly, although the anxiety 
and depressive component of negative affectivity are highly correlated, the first 
appears more associated with concurrent symptom overreporting, whereas the latter 
with retrospective overreporting [49]. Studies further show that anxious states and 
appraisals during symptom episodes mediate the effect of trait negative affectivity on 
symptom overreporting [7,17**; see Table 1], whereas reappraisal during the 
experience or a focus on sensory rather than on affective aspects of the experience 
counteracts overreporting in anxious persons [18**,88].  
 An interesting new hypothesis is that enhanced affective-motivational responding 
to threatening somatic events may go at the expense of detailed sensory-perceptual 
processing, blurring a clear distinction between an emotional and a somatic state. 
This may explain a number of recent findings. First, high habitual symptom reporters 
and patients with somatoform disorders show diminished correspondence between 
induced physiological reactions and self-reported symptoms [81,89]. Second, 
elevated symptom reports can be elicited in these persons by simply inducing 
negative affect (through picture viewing) despite the absence of differences in 
physiological arousal [83,84*,90,91*], suggesting that presenting affective cues 
substantially biases the experience of a somatic state. Third, patients with 
somatoform disorder do not exhibit a peak-end memory bias after an experimentally 
induced dyspnea episode [37,88]: Despite an identical physiological response pattern 
compared to healthy controls, exhibiting a clear peak and an end with lower intensity, 
patients’ retrospective integration of the symptom episode was not affected by the 
actual changes in symptoms over the period. Fourth, when given health-related cue 
words for autobiographical memory retrieval, patients with somatoform disorder 
exhibit reduced autobiographical memory specificity after controlling for depression 
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and rumination [92**]. Also this finding suggests that somatoform patients process 
and encode health-related episodes in memory in a little detailed way. Fifth, 
retrospectively reported symptom intensity of a distressing somatic experience 
increases over a two-week period in high habitual symptom reporters [17**]. 
Interestingly, by manipulating the processing focus towards affective aspects while 
experiencing a symptom episode this effect is reproduced regardless of pre-exisiting 
individual differences, whereas focusing on sensory-perceptual aspects eliminates 
this effect [88]. These results consistently suggest that understanding elevated 
symptom reporting in high habitual symptom reporters and in patients with 
somatoform disorder may shed light on the specific way they have experienced and 
encoded symptom episodes and retrieve them from memory when reporting 
symptoms in response to questions and questionnaires. 
 
Implications for future research 
Research conducted in the past two decades has considerably changed our view 
on assessment of bodily (and other) symptoms. It became clear that several 
variables moderate which type of information is reflected in the ratings and that 
different types of information may be relevant for different types of outcomes. It is 
obvious that further investigation of the psychological processes by which a response 
to a question comes about is of paramount importance in two ways: first, to improve 
measurement procedures and, second, to understand how psychological processes 
leading to systematic bias in particular patient groups may be intertwined with and 
inform about pathological processes, and, as such, provide a window for intervention.  
As to the first goal, measuring symptoms and more broadly, health and well-being, 
in an accurate, valid and reliable way, EMA is uniquely indicated to capture levels, 
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variability, temporal relationships and context-dependency of self-reported health-
related variables [e.g., 93]. The increasing availability of wearable technology and 
body sensors will ever more allow to measure self-reported variables conjointly with 
(psycho)physiological responses and create unprecedented opportunities to collect 
data from “experiencing selves” in real time and space. At the same time, these new 
measurement strategies pose important new theoretical and methodological 
challenges for the future [94]. But also within the realm of more paper-and-pencil 
tests, a variety of sophisticated yet practical measures and measurement 
approaches (e.g. based on item-response theory and computer adapted testing) are 
increasingly being developed and made available by the Patient-Reported Outcomes 
Measurement Information System initiative [95].  
As to the second goal, the findings above suggesting that an overreactive 
evaluative system, possibly combined with reduced sensory-perceptual processing, 
may play a crucial role in systematic symptom overreporting. This may open a 
window to not only change bias in symptom reporting, but also change the very 
psycho(patho)logical processes themselves. For example, modulating the affective 
evaluation of the experience has recently been demonstrated to counteract bias in 
retrospective self-reports [18**,88,96]. Also improving sensory-perceptual processing 
by means of interoceptive training reduced the levels of symptom reports in 
somatoform patients [97], while EMA combined with symptom reattributions in real 
time resulted in reduced symptom reports [98*]. 
Another strategy could be used to modify already consolidated memories of 
health-related events through, for example, a retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) task. 
Using this task, Marche, Briere, and von Baeyer [99*] showed that guided recurrent 
recall of positive details of initial pain memory in children led to forgetting of negative 
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aspects which subsequently affected coping strategies. Reactivating 
autobiographical and emotional memories of symptom episodes and subsequently 
updating them via a process of reconsolidation [e.g., 100,101**] could be a useful 
strategy to modify somatic memories in patients with somatoform and somatic 
symptom disorder, which may both help the patient and reduce bias in symptom 
reporting. 
 
Conclusion 
Clinicians and researchers often rely on retrospective symptom reports in clinical 
interviews and in traditional questionnaires. However, characteristics of the somatic 
experience, the retention interval as well as state and trait-related individual 
differences may influence and bias these reports. Recent research suggests that 
questions prompting the respondent to provide symptom reports may probe different 
types of information depending on the recall period. Each type of information is 
predictive of different outcomes. Understanding stable individual differences in 
symptom overreporting in somatoform disorders or somatic symptom disorders may 
also provide a window into pathological processes involved in experiencing and 
encoding somatic experiences that can be targeted for intervention.     
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Key points 
• Retrospective symptom reports in clinical interviews and in traditional 
questionnaires are often biased.  
• Characteristics of the somatic experience, the retention interval, and state and 
trait-related individual differences are important biasing factors.  
• Questions prompting the respondent to provide symptom reports may probe 
different types of information depending on the recall period. Each type of 
information is predictive of different outcomes.  
• Stable individual differences in symptom overreporting in somatoform 
disorders or somatic symptom disorders are related to psycho(patho)logical 
processes involved in experiencing and encoding somatic experiences that 
can be targeted for intervention.    
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Table 1. Factors affecting accuracy and bias of retrospective symptom reports. 
 
Factor Effect Symptom 
Characteristics of 
somatic 
experience 
  
Variability of 
symptom levels 
in real time 
Higher variability related to: 
symptom overreporting 
higher recall discrepancies 
accurate recall 
 
pain [28], headache [29]; 
fatigue [30]; 
pain [31,32] 
 
Intensity of peak 
and end of 
symptoms 
The most intense (peak) and final 
(end) moments of experience  
determine retrospective 
evaluation while duration is 
largely neglected (known as 
peak-end effect) 
 
pain [33–36], 
dyspnea [17**,37] 
Intensity of 
initial symptoms 
Higher initial intensity related to: 
higher overreporting 
lower recall discrepancy 
underestimation  
 
pain [12]; 
fatigue [30]; 
pain [38] 
 
Intensity of 
symptoms at 
retrieval 
Higher symptom intensity at 
recall related to greater 
overreporting 
 
pain [11,39,40], 
dyspnea [41] 
   
Retention interval Longer time periods are related 
to a decrease in 
correspondence/greater 
overreporting 
pain [10,38], symptoms 
[42] 
   
Affective state 
during a somatic 
experience 
  
State anxiety Higher state anxiety related to 
greater overreporting 
 
pain [7,43] 
State distress Higher state distress related to 
greater overreporting 
pain [44], negative 
memories [9] 
 
State negative 
affect 
Higher state negative affect 
related to overreporting  
pain [16,17**,45], 
dyspnea [17**] 
 
Recalled affective 
state 
Higher recalled state anxiety is 
related to higher retrospective 
ratings  
pain intensity and 
unpleasantness [21*,46*] 
Individual 
differences (trait) 
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Anxiety Higher anxiety related to greater 
overreporting 
negative/unpleasant 
affect [47], pain [8,48], 
pain-related fear [7], 
symptoms [49] 
 
Anxiety 
sensitivity 
Higher anxiety sensitivity related 
to greater overreporting 
pain [18**], pain-related 
fear [7] 
 
Negative 
affectivity 
Higher negative affectivity related 
to: 
greater overreporting 
 
 
 
underestimation  
 
 
symptoms [50], negative 
affective states [51,52], 
pre-treatment distress 
[22];  
positive emotions [52] 
 
Depression Higher depression related to:  
greater overreporting 
 
lower recall discrepancy  
 
negative emotions [52], 
symptoms [49];  
fatigue [30] 
 
Catastrophizing Higher catastrophizing related to: 
lower recall discrepancy 
higher retrospective ratings  
 
fatigue [30], pain [39]; 
pain [6*] 
 
Self-esteem, 
optimism 
Higher self-esteem and optimism 
related to: 
overreporting  
underestimation 
 
 
positive emotions [52]; 
negative emotions [52] 
 	
 
 
 
 
